Yancheng PV Pricing Compliance Meeting

Executive Summary

The recent photovoltaic industry meeting in Yancheng, Jiangsu, has been widely described as a meeting on “module price control.” However, the available public information indicates that this description is too broad.

The meeting was primarily a pricing-compliance guidance activity. Its stated objective was to strengthen cost accounting across the photovoltaic supply chain and implement the General Rules for the Photovoltaic Industry Cost-Accounting Model.

The initiative should therefore be understood as an attempt to:

• Establish more consistent cost-accounting standards;

• Discourage persistent below-cost selling and irrational bidding;

• Improve pricing compliance and procurement quality;

• Reduce destructive price competition;

• Encourage competition based on efficiency, quality, technology and service.

It should not currently be interpreted as an official government-imposed module price floor. As of August 7, 2026, no publicly available post-meeting communiqué, mandatory minimum module price or detailed enforcement mechanism has been identified.

1. Confirmed Information About the Meeting

According to public reporting, the Price Supervision and Anti-Unfair Competition Bureau of China’s State Administration for Market Regulation planned to hold a photovoltaic-industry pricing-compliance guidance activity in Yancheng on July 31, 2026.

The invited participants reportedly included the China Photovoltaic Industry Association and relevant companies from the photovoltaic sector. A senior executive from a module manufacturer confirmed that the activity was being arranged in Yancheng.

The stated purpose was to strengthen industry cost accounting and promote implementation of the new photovoltaic cost-accounting model.

Current information status

• Yancheng pricing-compliance activity — Confirmed through public reporting and an industry executive.

• Unified cost-accounting model — Confirmed as a stated objective.

• Action against disorderly below-cost competition — Supported by China’s existing regulatory framework.

• Mandatory national minimum module price — Unconfirmed; no official public document has been identified.

• Unified quotations or mandatory production cuts — Unconfirmed; no formal public requirement has been announced.

Source: First Financial / Shanghai Securities News

https://www.yicai.com/news/103297068.html

2. What “Module Price Control” Actually Means

2.1 A Common Cost-Accounting Framework

The new cost-accounting model is intended to establish a more consistent methodology across the polysilicon, wafer, cell and module segments.

It may help standardize the treatment of:

• Raw and auxiliary materials;

• Electricity and other energy costs;

• Direct labor and manufacturing expenses;

• Equipment depreciation;

• Yield loss and production waste;

• Research and development expenses;

• Quality-control and warranty costs;

• Differences between technologies, formats and efficiency classes.

A common model gives regulators and buyers a more consistent cost reference. It does not automatically create a legally binding selling price.

2.2 Possible Scrutiny of Below-Cost Transactions

China’s pricing-policy framework states that market-regulated products should generally be priced independently by companies, based on production costs and supply-and-demand conditions.

In sectors affected by serious pricing disorder, the regulatory process may include:

1) Compliance education and regulatory guidance;

2) Reminders or formal warnings;

3) Cost investigations and pricing inspections;

4) Enforcement where illegal conduct is identified.

Exceptionally low tender prices could therefore face greater scrutiny concerning their cost structure and commercial assumptions.

Source: National Development and Reform Commission

https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/jd/jd/202510/t20251009_1400869_ext.html

2.3 Greater Attention to Procurement Quality

Future procurement may place more emphasis on total project value and long-term reliability, including:

• Module efficiency and power density;

• Long-term degradation and warranty strength;

• Manufacturer bankability and delivery reliability;

• Product traceability, inspection and after-sales support.

2.4 Price Discipline Is Not Coordinated Price-Fixing

China’s antitrust guidelines prohibit industry associations from organizing competitors to fix prices, coordinate price increases, restrict discounts or impose minimum resale prices.

The regulatory objective must therefore balance two different risks: destructive below-cost competition and coordinated pricing among competing manufacturers.

Key interpretation: The Yancheng meeting should not be presented as an agreement among manufacturers to maintain a common minimum price. Its confirmed focus is cost accounting and pricing compliance.

Source: SAMR Antitrust Guidelines for Industry Associations

https://www.samr.gov.cn/zw/zfxxgk/fdzdgknr/fldzfys/art/2024/art_3ce3a7fec76146cfb8a7927db10683b2.html

3. Market Conditions Around the Meeting

Before the meeting, the Chinese module market remained under pressure from weak demand, excess capacity, inventory and continued competition for orders.

Price snapshot around July 29, 2026

• TOPCon modules for Chinese utility-scale projects: RMB 0.65–0.73/W; reference level approximately RMB 0.70/W.

• TOPCon modules for Chinese distributed projects: RMB 0.69–0.78/W; reference level approximately RMB 0.74/W.

• HJT modules in China: RMB 0.73–0.83/W; reference level approximately RMB 0.75/W.

• China-made TOPCon modules for European projects, FOB: USD 0.108–0.133/W; reference level approximately USD 0.121/W.

Source: InfoLink spot-price data

https://www.infolink-group.com/spot-price/cn/

4. Initial Market Reaction

The first reaction appears to have been stronger in upstream materials and cells than in finished modules:

• Some suppliers temporarily withheld quotations;

• Resistance to accepting new low-priced orders increased;

• Certain cell producers reduced deeply discounted deliveries;

• Cell-price increases of approximately RMB 0.005–0.01/W were discussed;

• Downstream acceptance remained uncertain.

Utility-scale TOPCon module prices nevertheless remained broadly within the previous RMB 0.65–0.73/W range. The meeting therefore affected pricing expectations and seller behavior before producing a clear change in module transactions.

Source: InfoLink market update

https://www.infolink-group.com/energy-article/cn/pv-spot-price-20260805

5. Why a Strong Price Increase Is Not Yet Certain

Weak End-Market Demand

If project developers remain cautious or delay procurement, manufacturers will continue competing for a limited number of orders.

Existing Inventory

Manufacturers, distributors and overseas warehouses hold inventory purchased at different cost levels. Older stock can be sold below current replacement cost without necessarily reflecting the cost of new production.

Overcapacity and Cash-Flow Pressure

A cost-accounting standard does not remove production capacity. Some manufacturers may continue accepting low-margin or loss-making orders to generate cash, maintain utilization or preserve customer relationships.

Different Cost Structures

Costs vary according to technology, integration, utilization, depreciation, financing and purchasing terms. A price that is loss-making for one producer may remain viable for another.

6. Possible Market Scenarios

Scenario A: Stabilization

This is the current base case: fewer extreme quotations, stronger pricing discipline, shorter quotation validity and broadly stable module prices.

Scenario B: Gradual Recovery

A recovery becomes more likely if formal cost investigations, production reductions, inventory declines and changes in major tender-evaluation rules appear together. Prices would probably recover first in wafers and cells, followed by modules.

Scenario C: Limited Policy Impact

Low-priced transactions could return if no detailed enforcement mechanism emerges, demand remains weak and manufacturers continue facing severe cash-flow pressure.

7. Implications for the European Market

The Yancheng meeting alone is unlikely to cause an immediate increase in European warehouse prices. European pricing is also affected by local inventory, installation demand, currency movements, financing, sea freight, traceability requirements, technology, warranty and manufacturer bankability.

Shipping costs for a 40-foot high-cube container from China to Rotterdam reportedly increased from below USD 2,000 at the February low to more than USD 4,800, with some capacity exceeding USD 6,000. Higher freight costs provide support for European landed and spot prices even when Chinese FOB prices remain weak.

Source: InfoLink European market analysis

https://www.infolink-group.com/energy-article/cn/solar-topic-2026-intersolar-europe

8. Commercial Recommendations for Solligent

Quotation Strategy

• Use quotation-validity periods of approximately five to seven working days during volatile periods;

• Separate European ex-stock prices from new replacement-order prices;

• Clearly specify whether quotations are EXW, FOB, CIF, DDP or warehouse-delivered;

• Include freight, insurance, financing and currency assumptions in internal margin calculations.

Recommended Customer Communication

“China is strengthening pricing compliance and cost-accounting supervision across the photovoltaic supply chain. This may reduce the availability of unsustainably low-priced supply, but no official mandatory minimum module price has been publicly announced.”

Product Positioning

For 730–750W high-power modules, commercial messaging should focus on:

• Higher power density and fewer modules required per megawatt;

• Potential reductions in mounting and cabling requirements;

• Faster installation and lower balance-of-system costs;

• Reliable warranties, supply and delivery.

Inventory Management

• Distinguish old-cost inventory from new replacement cost;

• Check replenishment prices before approving substantial discounts;

• Classify stock by manufacturer, age, power class and warranty;

• Verify whether unusually low supplier prices involve aged stock, non-standard grades, rebates or restrictive payment terms.

9. Key Indicators to Monitor

1) Official communications following the Yancheng meeting;

2) Detailed cost-accounting methodologies;

3) Formal cost investigations or regulatory warnings;

4) Polysilicon, wafer, cell and module quotations;

5) Factory utilization and production schedules;

6) Inventory levels in China and Europe;

7) State-owned enterprise tender results;

8) Supplier quotation-validity periods;

9) Freight rates from China to Northern Europe.

Final Assessment

The Yancheng meeting represents a meaningful step toward greater pricing discipline in the Chinese photovoltaic industry. Its most important contribution is a more consistent framework for discussing production costs and identifying potentially unsustainable pricing behavior.

It has not yet produced a publicly confirmed module price floor. In the short term, it is more likely to reduce extreme low-price quotations than to trigger a sharp, industry-wide increase.

For European distributors, the appropriate response is disciplined quotation management, careful control of replacement costs, selective inventory positioning and stronger value-based selling of high-efficiency modules.

Information note: This report is based on publicly available regulatory statements, industry reporting and market-price publications available as of August 7, 2026. Unconfirmed market claims are identified separately from verified information. This document is provided for market-intelligence purposes and does not constitute legal, regulatory or investment advice.